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Roger Sarty 
There was a real possibility, British 
naval leaders believed, that the fast 
German cruisers might attempt a raid 
on the port.2 The garrison had to be 
alert, but on 1 March 1915 an excess of 
zeal nearly brought tragedy to two 
Halifax families. 
At mid-morning on that day, Miss 
Alice O'Brien, 25, left her father's house on 
Lucknow Street in the city's fashionable south 
end for a ride on her horse, which was at a stable 
a few blocks away. The O'Briens lived in one half, 
No. 10, of a double house which had been built 
around 1890. The wooden building was typically 
late Victorian, with two narrow, high-ceilinged 
stories whose front wall was almost flush with 
the sidewalk. Alice's father, the federal 
government's inspector of weights and measures, 
was at his downtown office when she left for her 
ride. Mrs. O'Brien had also gone downtown, to 
shop, and only the maid remained at home. 
Number 12 Lucknow, separated from number 
10 by a partition wall, belonged to L. Clyde 
Davidson, a publisher and stationer. In the 
Davidson house as well, the maid alone was 
present.3 
Shortly after Alice began her ride, a little 
steamer, the federal Department of Marine and 
Fisheries vessel Brant, chugged out from the 
inner harbour. It stopped off the central part of 
McNab's Island to place a marker buoy over a 
shoal.4 Brant was still inside the "examination 
line" where every ship wishing to enter harbour 
had to identify itself to the navy's "examination 
vessel." Supporting the examination vessel were 
the powerful guns of Fort McNab, atop a 100-
foot hill at the southern end of McNab's Island. 
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According to Murphy 's law, if something can go wrong it will go 
wrong. This is especially true of military 
operations, which involve complicated 
equipment, large numbers of people, 
and rapidly changing situations. As 
Halifax has been a fortress town for two 
and a half centur ies it is almost 
inevitable that at some time or another 
the garrison would damage the city through well-
intentioned efforts to protect the place. In light 
of the fact that coastal defence guns operated 
within a couple of thousands yards of the city 
until 1960, it is perhaps surprising that there 
were so few accidents. The most serious mishap 
occurred during the First World War. 
At the end of July and the beginning of 
August 1914 the Halifax defences mobilized 
according to well-laid plans. The garrison 
included about 3,000 troops, of whom a third 
were professional soldiers of the permanent 
force, and the rest militiamen from around the 
Maritimes. They built trenches at positions on 
the outer harbour where German saboteurs or 
raiding parties might land, and manned six 
modern coast artillery forts that the British army 
had built before turning the fortress over to the 
Canadian government in 1905-6.' 
Halifax was of great strategic importance. 
The British war effort depended upon the supply 
of raw materials and equipment from North 
America across the Atlantic, and this vital 
seaborne trade was a logical target for Germany's 
powerful navy. Halifax served as a secure haven 
for merchant ships and also as a protected base 
from which the Royal Navy's warships could 
track down German commerce raiding cruisers. 
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Brant, on its return trip, had passed 
Ives Point Battery, which, from its 
position on the north-western tip of 
McNab's Island, stood guard over the 
entrance to the inner harbour. The 
officer in charge was u n d e r 
instructions to let no ship pass the 
fort into the port unless it had been 
cleared by the examination service. 
Brant had not been cleared and 
ignored signals from the fort, so the 
gunners did what they had trained to 
do. One of the fort's 12-pounder guns 
placed a shell behind the steamer. 
There was no reaction. A second shot 
kicked up the water scarcely 25 feet 
ahead of the bow when, as we have 
seen, Brant stopped.6 
By this time, shortly after noon, 
Alice O'Brien had finished riding and 
started home. A block or so from 
Lucknow Street she met a friend who 
blurted out that something dreadful 
had happened. Hurrying on, Alice was 
horrified to see a crowd around her 
house: many of the upper storey 
windows were shattered, and bits of 
plaster and splintered wood were 
scattered about. 
Just before Alice's return, people in the area 
had heard a whistling sound, and then an 
explosion on the roof of the O'Brien house. 
Images of a German cruiser or of a Zeppelin 
pouring high explosives into the city flashed 
through the minds of some witnesses. With less 
fertile imaginations, the O'Brien and Davidson 
maids, who, fortunately, had been hanging 
laundry in the backyard, assumed something 
had gone wrong with the heating system.7 
The furnace had not exploded and the 
Germans had not arrived. On the staircase inside 
the O'Brien house, beneath holes in the roof, 
lay a lump of steel engraved with damning 
evidence: a broad arrow and the digits 11-97 
showed it to be par t of an artillery shell 
manufactured for the British government in 
November 1897. One of the shells from Ives Point 
Battery had apparently bounced off the water 
and whizzed over the south end of the city to hit 
the centre of the roof of numbers 10-12 Lucknow 
Street, some 3,700 yards from the fort. On 
If a ship violated the regulations, a six-inch gun, 
designated the "examination gun," would fire a 
round across the offender's bow. In the event a 
few "bring-to" rounds failed to inspire co-
operation, the garrison had instructions to fire 
for effect and destroy the vessel. The examination 
system thus worked as a trip-wire to bring the 
defences down on a disguised enemy raider 
before it could slip into the port to drop mines 
and shoot up moored vessels and the dockyard.5 
At 1145 hours Brant turned around and 
headed back towards the inner harbour. In the 
words of the steamer's master: 
.. .left for Indian Point buoy, running slow speed; 
dinner bell rung and I left pilot house for dinner. 
As I was taking my dinner I heard what I thought 
was the 12 o'clock gun; took no notice. As I was 
returning to pilot house I heard a second shot. I 
stopped ship, as we were at Indian Point buoy, 
and to give men time to get their dinner. As we 
were engaged in lifting buoy, officer came 
alongside and informed me to proceed to Patrol 
Ship [the examination vessel], which I did. The 
Officer came aboard and saw the work we were 
engaged in. 
56 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss2/5
harbour, as the boundary. Consequently, the 
navy had informed the master of Brant that he 
need not report to the examination vessel unless 
he passed outside the vessel, while the militia 
officer commanding at Ives Point Battery was 
under instructions to challenge any vessel 
attempting to enter past his fort without 
clearance.9 
The militia adopted the navy's boundary, as 
it should have already done. The navy had 
precedence in all matters concerning the 
regulation of ship movements. There had been 
a second lapse in the defence arrangements, 
however. The best way to let the crusty captains 
of local craft go about their business without 
locking antlers with the battery commanders was 
to have the harbour craft fly special recognition 
signals. The Halifax Defence Scheme, the 
lengthy secret document on the basis of which 
the fortress had mobilized for war, had provided 
for precisely this, but in the confusion of August 
1914 it had not been done. 
There was no difficulty in ensuring that the 
two services applied the same regulations in the 
same way, but nevertheless the accident was a 
chilling reminder that every warning shot fired 
by the fortress guns might endanger the lives 
and property of the population around the 
striking the building a contact fuze detonated 
the charge in the shell. 
Designed to tear open the hulls of torpedo 
boats and destroyers, the exploding round blew 
a hole two feet by four feet in the roof over the 
O'Brien's staircase and spread fragments which 
ripped a half-dozen holes, one 18 inches in 
diameter, in the roof of the Davidson house. 
Other steel splinters blasted through the 
partition, flew across the adjacent stairwell in 
the Davidson house, penetrated a second wall 
and entered one of the bedrooms, smashing 
some of the furniture. One fragment was found 
buried six inches in the far exterior wall of the 
Davidson house.8 
Good luck alone had prevented deaths or 
severe injuries. The coast gunners knew that 
shells could ricochet like this, and yet had run 
the risk to stop, of all things, a government 
steamer. What had gone awry? 
Militia and navy headquarters in Ottawa 
concluded that the accident was the result of a 
failure of inter-service co-operation. The navy 
regarded the examination service line under Fort 
McNab as the official entrance to the port. The 
militia, however, treated the Ives Point-Point 
Pleasant line, some two miles further inside the 
The house at No. 10/12 Lucknow Street that was hit by an errant "bring-to" shot 
fired from a 12-pounder gun at the the Ives Point Battery on McNab Island. 
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The 12-pounder Q.F. [Quick Fire] gun position, 
Hugonins Battery, McNab Island, Halifax, NS, 
September 1914. 
examination service at Halifax even in the spring 
of 1916 when the low level of the German threat 
allowed some reduction in the readiness of the 
city's defences.14 
Happily for the townspeople, the militia did 
not forget civilian safety. Realizing that the six-
inch gun was far too powerful for the 
examination role, the militia mounted a small 
six-pounder gun at Fort McNab expressly to fire 
warning rounds. The light six-pound projectile 
was sufficient to throw up a menacing geyser of 
water, but did not have the mass and power to 
ricochet anything like hundred-pound or even 
twelve-pound she l l s , and would do 
correspondingly less damage in the event of a 
mishap.15 
These decis ions set a p receden t for 
procedures at all of Canada's defended harbours 
in both world wars. At each port the lightest gun 
available was assigned to the examination 
service, and fired warning rounds without 
restriction when ships violated port-entry 
procedures. In these ways the Lucknow Street 
accident directly influenced Canadian coastal 
defence policy.16 
In Halifax, the Liberal Morning Chronicle 
ominously noted that this was not the first time 
shells had bounced from the harbour, but the 
Conservative Herald assured its readers "that a 
similar mishap will never occur again."17 City 
Council did not discuss the accident. The only 
mention of the military in the council minutes 
for the spring of 1915 is a motion to urge the 
federal government to despatch more troops for 
overseas service through Halifax.1S The increased 
shipping traffic resulting from the war, after all, 
meant prosperity for the city. 
The Department of Militia and Defence 
arranged for repairs to the Davidson and O'Brien 
houses. It was not, however, easy to cover the 
building's wounds. In 1976 Miss O'Brien showed 
the author cracks ten feet long in the plaster 
above the staircase at number 10 Lucknow. But 
the O'Briens at least enjoyed the element of the 
ridiculous in the incident. A relative in England 
wrote to them about the bombing raids on 
British cities by German Zeppelins, and the 
O'Briens replied that "we are being shelled too, 
but by our own people!" 
harbour. This was a dilemma. Pending a 
judgement from higher authorities the coastal 
gunners took the politic course by deciding that 
no gun should be fired towards the inner 
harbour, with its heavily built-up shores, unless 
a ship was "obviously hostile."10 
At the centre of the difficulty was the six-
inch examination gun in Fort McNab. In this role 
the weapon was more likely to fire in the 
direction of the city and outlying settlements than 
any other in the fortress. It had, in fact, already 
displayed an awesome ricochet. One round fired 
at a target 1,500 yards out in the main channel 
had finally ploughed up a farmer's field far 
beyond the opposite shore, over six miles from 
the battery, and distressingly close to a church. 
The hundred-pound projectile of the six-inch 
gun, moreover, was eight times heavier than the 
shell that hit the house on Lucknow Street.] ' 
On studying the situation, the militia and 
navy agreed that if the examination service was 
to be effective in preventing a potentially 
catastrophic attack on the city by a disguised 
enemy raider, then the examination gun had to 
be free to fire without restriction. "[D]amage to 
property on shore must be accepted as a possible 
consequence" of fully ready defences. Militia 
headquarters in Ottawa therefore ordered that 
the examination gun should fire warning rounds 
at every ship that defied the examination service, 
even if the gun had to fire towards the city.12 At 
this very time, the Canadian government received 
intelligence that Germany might be preparing a 
naval raid on the Canadian coast.13 Although this 
alarm, like many other similar ones during the 
early months of the war, came to nothing, it did 
confirm the wisdom of not relaxing defence 
measures at key ports like Halifax. Certainly the 
British Admiralty was adamant on the point, 
insist ing on the maintenance of the full 
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Author's Note 
Ioriginally learned of this incident from my great uncle, E.A. Thompson, who had spent 
the whole of his life in Halifax. During my first 
forays, as a graduate student, into the military 
records at the National Archives in Ottawa, I was 
delighted to find documentation in both the 
militia and naval files on the city's defences. 
During the summer of 1976 I pursued the story 
during a summer research trip to Halifax, and 
discovered that Miss O'Brien still lived at the 
house on Lucknow Street. She was then a very 
spry 86, and had vivid recollections of the events 
of 1 March 1915. 
The article is a slightly cleaned up version 
of the original drafts that I produced in the late 
1970s. There are two points I would add on the 
basis of subsequent work. The failure of 
communication between the navy and the militia, 
and the obvious shakiness of the navy's 
arrangements, is not surprising considering the 
newness, troubled beginnings, and meagre 
resources of the navy. It had been founded only 
in 1910, and soon thereafter, because of political 
controversy, virtually abandoned by the 
government. The naval aspects of the Halifax 
defence scheme had previously been poorly 
handled by the Department of Marine and 
Fisheries, and in 1910-14 the navy did much to 
improve the arrangements, but had almost 
nothing, aside from resources borrowed from 
other government departments, to work with.19 
More generally, the incident to some limited 
extent foreshadowed the catastrophic Halifax 
explosion of December 1917. The navy was 
legally responsible for shipping traffic control 
within the port in wartime, but did not have the 
resources or support of other government 
authorities to make that control fully effective. 
This was obviously the source of the 1915 
incident. It was less obviously the case 
concerning the collision between merchant 
vessels that caused the disaster in 1917, but the 
navy's shortcomings were the target of public 
outrage, and figured prominently in the official 
inquiries into the disaster. 
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